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Jacques Maritain’s Ethics of Art
Anthony Richard Haynes
Abstract
I examine Jacques Maritain’s views on the relationship between art
and ethics or what is today called the ‘ethical criticism of art’, and
examine what Maritain’s thought can contribute to debates in con-
temporary aesthetics and wider society. In part I of the article, I
approach Maritain’s attempted reconciliation of artistic freedom and
the demands of morality in three steps, first recalling Maritain’s defi-
nition of art, second looking at Maritain’s analysis of the extra-artistic
concerns of the artist, and third offering a critique of Maritain’s views
on why art is valued by the community and what justifiable moral
claims of the community upon the artist might be—particularly re-
garding the method of production of artworks. Comparing Maritain’s
theories to those of contemporary writers in part II, I argue that
Maritain’s ethics of art can be used to complement Jacques Rancie`re’s
notions of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ and ‘artistic regimes’, and
that, in the terminology of the ethical criticism of art, Maritain af-
firms a position which is a composite of ‘moderate moralism’ and
‘ethicism’—a position which is both explanatorily powerful in as-
certaining how and why we recognise and value art, and flexible in
accommodating changing artistic forms and practices.
Keywords




The problem of the relationship between art and ethics is more press-
ing today than ever, when art, like ethics, is aware of its essence
and the purposes of its activties or lack thereof—when art, like
ethics, seems to be shapeless, fluid, prizing freedom and freedom of
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2 Jacques Maritain’s Ethics of Art
innovation and novelty sometimes without regard to established so-
cietal principles and traditions. Perhaps the greatest transformations
in our notion and practices of art are the attack on the notion that
beauty is a necessary property of an artwork by artists such as Mar-
cel Duchamp and philosophers and critics such as Arthur Danto,1 the
claim by Duchamp and others after him that any object whatsoever
can be a piece of art if the artist merely says it is,2 and the rise of
‘conceptual art’, with artists and critics such as LeWitt claiming that
‘Ideas alone can be works of art’.3 As such, the present situation of
art today is one in which many things which would not have been
considered art in the past—including ugly, shocking, grotesque and
sometimes pornographic artefacts and performances which seemingly
require no manual skill or craftsmanship—are accepted and promoted
as art.4
What is the relationship between art and morality? More particu-
larly, are there moral parameters on what an artist can create, or is
art amoral in its subject-matter and practices? Does the community
in which the artist operates have any moral claims on the artist? And
if morality—either in the form of personal obligations or interper-
sonal claims and obligations in and to the community—bears upon
the activity of an artist, isn’t the artist’s freedom threatened, and isn’t
art’s ability to innovate with new ideas, methods and forms at risk?
Maritain’s first book on the philosophy and ethics of art, Art et
scholastique (Art and Scholasticism) was published in 1920, and his
final book on art, The Responsibility of the Artist, comprising lectures
given at Princeton University in 1951, was published in 1960. We
might consider some examples of what writers around that time said
about our general problem so as to appreciate the diversity of views.
Flannery O’Connor, who was very much influenced by Maritain’s
philosophy of art said, when giving a lecture on fiction:
. . . art is writing something that is valuable in itself and that works in
itself. The basis of art is truth, both in matter and in mode. The person
1 Arthur Danto, What Art Is (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), p. 28.
2 Marcel Duchamp, M. Interview with Martin Friedman, October 1965, via: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYqDpNmnu8I.
3 Sol LeWitt, ‘Sentences on Conceptual Art’, in A. Alberro and B. Stimson eds.,
Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), p. 107.
4 For a detailed discussion of these issues with regard to the problem of defining art,
see my article ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, New Blackfriars, vol. 96, no. 1065
(2015), pp. 527–541. Moving from defining art to the ethical criticism of art, this paper,
which was originally presented at a conference on Jacques Maritain at Quarr Abbey in
September 2015 and subsequently revised for publication in New Blackfriars, builds upon
conceptual content from the previous article and thus serves as a sequel insofar as the
question of what art is has to do with normative or prescriptive principles as much as
descriptive principles, which did not previously receive much explicit discussion.
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who aims after art in his work aims after truth, in an imaginative sense,
no more and no less.5
Albert Camus, in his Nobel Prize Banquet Speech, stated:
Whatever our personal weaknesses may be, the nobility of our craft
will always be rooted in two commitments, difficult to maintain: the
refusal to lie about what one knows and the resistance to oppression.6
Contrary to these views is that of Andre´ Gide, who, writing some
years before Art and Scholasticism, implies in the preface to his
novel The Immoralist that while a piece of art may consider a gen-
eral or universal problem, the particularisation of the problem in an
artwork—for example, a moral problem for a character in a novel—
literally confines the problem in all respects to the artwork in which
it is presented. Gide says: ‘To tell the truth, in art there are no
problems—that are not sufficiently solved by the work of art itself.’7
D. H. Lawrence gives a rather different view in his essay ‘Why the
Novel Matters’—claiming neither that the writer has moral obliga-
tions imposed upon him from without nor that he does not, that ethics
is a branch of enquiry within and for the aesthetics of an artwork.
Rather, Lawrence argues that only the writer has the most complete
view of human life and morality, and that the novel is therefore the
most apt way to learn how to appreciate all modes of life and be
able to live wisely. Lawrence writes of his craft:
I am a man, and alive . . . for this reason I am a novelist. And being
a novelist, I consider myself superior to the saint, the scientist, the
philosopher, and the poet, who are all great masters of different bits
of man alive, but never get the whole hog . . .
And concerning morality:
There is no absolute good, there is nothing absolutely right. All things
flow and change, and even change is not absolute. The whole is a
strange assembly of apparently incongruous parts, slipping past one
another . . . In life, there is right and wrong, good and bad, all the
time. But what is right in one case is wrong in another . . . And only
in the novel are all things given full play, or at least, they may be
given full play, when we realise that life itself, and not inert safety, is
the reason for living.8
5 Flannery O’Connor, Mystery and Manners (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 65.
6 Albert Camus, Banquet Speech, available via: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
literature/laureates/1957/camus-speech.html.
7 Andre´ Gide, The Immoralist, trans. D. Bussy (1930 reprint), (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books Ltd., 1966), p. 8.
8 David H. Lawrence, ‘Why the Novel Matters’ available via: http://individual.utoronto.
ca/amlit/why_the_novel_matters.htm.
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Given the situation of modern art and the variety of views on the re-
lationship between art and morality, perhaps there is no surprise why
Jean Cocteau—master of many arts and of a view contrary to D. H.
Lawrence—sought Maritain’s counsel concerning artists and the arts,
writing to him that ‘To sustain them is your role, my dear Jacques.’9
Art and Prudence
What does Maritain have to say about our problem, a problem which,
as we have seen, was perhaps almost just as pressing in his day as it
is for us today? We begin by noting that Maritain conceives ‘poetry’
not just as the art of writing verses, but classically and like Cocteau,
as the ‘intercommunication between the inner being of things and the
inner being the human Self which is a kind of divination.’10 Poetry is
therefore ‘the secret life of each and all the arts’11 and any artist is a
poet in this general sense. Now, Maritain states our general problem
in The Responsibility of the Artist thus:
What are, in the poet, the novelist, the man dedicated to any kind
of creative art, the relations between the exigencies of poetry and
intellectual creativity and those of moral standards, which have to do
with the right use of human free will?12
Maritain provides an attempt at a general philosophical, conceptual
reconciliation between art and morality. He first asserts in all relevant
works that art and morality are two autonomous spheres, with no
‘intrinsic’ subordination between them: that is, that art itself is neither
fundamentally moral nor immoral, and morality does not in itself
consist of artistic or aesthetic qualities or aims.13 Maritain suggests
his overall answer to the problem, that while neither is intrinsically
subordinate to the other, there is extrinsic or indirect subordination,
and this is intelligible only when we take the whole human subject
and its unity into account.14
Allow us here to briefly recall the general philosophical framework
of Maritain’s thought on art. Rather than focusing on the ontology of
the artwork (the properties of the artefact or performance itself) as
9 Jean Cocteau and Jacques Maritain, Art and Faith: Letters Between Jacques Maritain
and Jean Cocteau, trans. J. Coleman (New York, N. Y.: The Philosophical Library, 1948),
p. 61.
10 Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (New York, NY: New
American Library, 1953), p. 3.
11 Ibid.
12 Jacques Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist (1960 reprint), (New York, NY:
Gordian Press, 1972), p. 15.
13 Ibid., pp. 23–29.
14 Ibid., pp. 33–41.
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many twentieth century and contemporary philosophers do, Maritain
aims to account for the capacity to be an artist. He defines ‘art’ in
medieval and Thomistic terms, generally as a virtue of the practical
intellect, a habit of the mind which deals with ‘making’ objects.
Now, the particular art we are concerned with—the so-called ‘fine
arts’—Maritain calls ‘free’ art: art that is not made for any purpose
other than itself.15 In this sense, art is concerned not with the person,
but solely with the good of the work.
Maritain contrasts art with the other practical virtue of prudence—
the principle of judgement which enables us to intuitively ascertain
the good for oneself in a given situation in accordance with the prior
ordering of our appetite and will. This good, however, is amoral.
Prudence infallibly chooses the ‘good’ that the situation demands for
us, but only within the parameters of goodness that we have already
decided beforehand. The question then is, what is the moral good
which is a prerequisite for prudence?
Moral good for Maritain is that which is in harmony with reason,
because humans are classically defined as rational animals. Maritain
claims that ‘goodness’ is a ‘transcendental’ (a property of being
as being), and thus that the ultimate Good is God. When we act
according to the good, we participate in and do God’s will. Maritain
insists that the only telos that offers human beings ultimate happiness
is God, implying that God should therefore be consciously chosen
as one’s own ultimate end. Acting according to reason, for Maritain,
is acting according to intuitively-known moral rules as to how
humans should behave. These are the precepts of ‘natural law’,
which have been bestowed upon us by God. Moral obligation arises
when our reason constrains our appetites (or desires) and will and
orders them to the precepts of natural law.16
Now, analogous to prudence, the virtue of art demands that we
never act against our art and do what would make us bad artists.
So how does Maritain aim to answer our original dilemma? Maritain
observes that ‘the artist is a man using Art’,17 and as such, ‘he is
a man before being [for example] a painter’.18 Moreover, it is clear
that while art (the activity of making; factible) does not encompass
‘morality’ (which is the realm of ‘doing’ or action; agibile),19 it is
clear that the latter encompasses the former: the creation of anything
is an action of human intelligence and will. As such, as the use of
free will, art is subordinated to morality, not in its object internally
but extrinsically. With Cocteau, Maritain aims to give art autonomy of
15 Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 40.
16 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 26–36.
17 Ibid., p. 26.
18 Ibid., p. 29.
19 Cocteau and Maritain, Art and Faith, pp. 123–124.
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subject matter, ends and procedures, but ultimately, as he says, ‘There
is no law against the law of which the destiny of man demands’.20
Acknowledging that Maritain’s ethics of art clearly rests upon a
traditional Catholic Christian and Thomist understanding of human
nature, life and ethics generally, let us consider Maritain’s solution
in more detail, first as it pertains to the individual artist himself and
second, how it pertains to the relationship between the artist and the
community in which he produces his art.
The Artist
One of the most interesting elements of Maritain’s books Art and
Faith and The Responsibility of the Artist is his concern with what
the extra-artistic concerns of the artist should be, with Maritain having
established that the artist is not exempt from moral considerations in
producing his work, given art’s material conditions.
Maritain insists that the artist, in being inspired by and wishing
to pass on the messages of his beliefs and loves, cannot have in
mind particular purposes such as payment or the political efficacy
of his or her work but rather what we may say are internalised or
subconscious modes of existing, such as religious faith, because the
former will interfere with the object of art, which is the good of
the work alone. Internalised modes of existing will provide one with
ready objects and their associated emotions from which to draw and
signify in the creation of an artwork, the virtue of art then operating
freely—which in Maritain’s philosophy of art is known as the artist’s
‘poetic knowledge.’21 Given that practical and particular purposes
derive from one’s material individuality, they risk the invasion of the
ego with its hangups and ambition into the creative process:22
It is precisely to the extent to which poetry is useless and disen-
gaged that poetry is necessary, because it brings to men a vision of
reality-beyond-reality, an experience of the secret meaning of things,
an obscure insight into the universe of beauty . . . 23
20 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, p. 41.
21 Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 534.
22 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 51–55. See also: Cocteau and Maritain,
Art and Faith, p. 86. It is also interesting to note Flannery O’Connor’s fundamental
agreement with Maritain’s view. O’Connor writes: ‘It eliminates any concern with the
motivation of the writer except as this finds its place inside the work. It also eliminates
any concern with the reader in his market sense. It also eliminates that tedious controversy
that always rages between people who declare that they write to express themselves and
those who declare that they write to fill their pocketbooks . . . ’ O’Connor, Mystery and
Manners, p. 65.
23 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, p. 85.
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However, the view that all particular purposes obstruct the virtue
of art in creative intuition and the good of the work seems false. It
seems that for some artists the artistic and the moral or political are
two sides of the same coin. For example, the public and political
mural art of Banksy—a ‘street artist’—is no less art and Banksy
is no less an artist for the particular purposes and messages that
his artworks aim to convey; the same goes for Naomi Shihab Nye,
a world-renowned poet, whose poems are sometimes uncompromis-
ingly political. And again, it seems that art movements predicated
on political or philosophical beliefs and manifestos such as dada or
futurism are no less genuinely artistic movements. Maritain is quite
right, however, to draw attention to the dangers of the allure of
prestige and a preoccupation with payment in creating an artwork;
Cocteau, as with many writers, talks about the need for the artist
to think of himself as a perpetual amateur so as to not get caught
up in convention, careerism and mere crowd-pleasing.24 I was also
once told by a homeless artist in Paris that he did not consider his
twenty-minute caricatures as art, and his talent and the potential of
many great pieces were undeniably being wasted in the exigency of
payment in the struggle to survive.
Maritain observes that an artwork is ‘always nourished by the ex-
perience of the man’.25 Here Maritain makes the issue practically
significant for artists themselves in arguing that the artist’s moral
character influences his work for better or worse. This we can cer-
tainly see for example with Sartre, whose early work Murdoch la-
belled a ‘psychology of the lonely individual’.26 In The Responsibility
of the Artist, Maritain claims that artists’ awareness of the influence
or indirect reflection of morality on art has led to the formation of
a ‘merely artistic morality’, that being a pseudo-system in which the
good of the work is made the artist’s ultimate moral good and in
which normally good qualities such as sincerity, moral purity, and
curiosity are perverted to a mere sincere acceptance of oneself as
one is, without acknowledging the need for moral compromises or
changes, a state in which the person is placed above good and evil,
and a state of mind which presses the artist to risk experience of
disaster or evil, if it might be a means of artistic inspiration.27
In outlining such a pseudo-system, Maritain perhaps identifies the
qualities of many of the avant-garde movements of the twentieth
century—even if he does have Oscar Wilde and probably also Andre´
Gide in mind. He perhaps makes a key concession, however, in his
24 Cocteau and Maritain, Art and Faith, pp. 23–24.
25 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, p. 93.
26 Iris Murdoch, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1959), p. 71.
27 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 93–96.
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later remark that it is impossible to know whether artworks would
be artistically better if their creator had followed the ‘moral law’
rather than merely artistic morality;28 but then again, it would not
have been possible for much avant-garde art to have been conceived
or produced if the artists had been strict Catholics or ‘Maritainians’,
and much good and beautiful art would never be created if artists
were not accepting of themselves.
So is there an answer to the conflict between (morally good) pru-
dence and art on the practical level, as per circumstance? It seems to
follow from Maritain’s position that artistic creativity and innovation
are at risk of being smothered by a rather all-absorbing morality. Here
I believe Maritain can only offer what is natural to him: a positive
notion of freedom through the theological virtue of Charity that al-
legedly makes us ‘intrinsically’ good and makes the ‘moral law’ our
friend and emancipator.29 In The Responsibility of the Artist, Maritain
offers a theological solution to the dilemma between art and (morally
correct) prudential judgement, quoting Franc¸ois Mauriac in the need
to ‘purify the source’—not the work, but oneself.30 He offers the
Christian spiritual gift of Wisdom as the means to a positive freedom
for the artist in his artistic and ethical life, precisely because wisdom
and art are two independent absolutes, and art, while imitating the
moral and spiritual virtues and the discipline required to attain them,
is of an different order altogether insofar as its activities and ends
are concerned.31 After exploring the position of the novelist with
respect to his or her moral and spiritual perfection, Maritain ends
The Responsibility of the Artist with a reiteration of the notion of the
positive freedom of the Christian faith internalised—shaping one’s
creative intuition and ‘occupational stream’ or vocation with regard
to the ‘perfection of human life’ or the path to sainthood. Working
through Charity directed to transcendent beauty, the artist can, as
Maritain says, ‘give himself totally twice at the same time, first to
his God and second to something that is a reflection of his God’.32
Now, we should not find it surprising that Maritain’s theological
solution is neither formulaic nor completely satisfying, particularly
for the non-believer for, as Maritain says to Cocteau, as poetry cannot
systematise itself to fulfil the purposes of philosophy, philosophy
cannot absorb art—it cannot descend from its heaven of abstractions
to the concrete situations and practical exigencies of art in its ever-
changing forms and mediums.33
28 Ibid., p. 96.
29 Ibid., pp. 41–45.
30 Ibid., p. 61, 67.
31 Ibid., pp. 62-64; Cocteau and Maritain, Art and Faith, pp. 116–118.
32 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 108–114.
33 Cocteau and Maritain, Art and Faith, pp. 116–118.
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As Maritain says, for the Christian artist, to be both a Christian
and a poet is a doubly hard task, for he or she is committed to
the hardest of disciplines and poverty of spirit.34 It seems to me
that we should consider the relationship between Christian morality
and the art of the Christian in terms analogous to one’s dynamic
relationship with God, with all its fluctuations in belief, commitment,
and compromises. For Cocteau, a ‘poet is nothing more than the
labourer of the schizophrenic . . . we all have within us and of whom
he alone is not ashamed.’35 And Maritain puts it best when he says:
The poet is both a madman carried along by irrational inspiration and a
craftsman exercising for his work the shrewdest operative reason. How
could you expect from him that stable balance and constant attention
to the rule of reason which perfection in moral life seems to require?36
The Artist and the Community
Maritain’s theological solution to the problem carries over into the
relationship between the artist and the community from whom he ac-
quires his intellectual material and to whom he addresses or presents
his work. Maritain operates with the view that art aims at beauty,
by definition. Beauty, like goodness, is a transcendental, and is om-
nipresent but also subject to ‘proper proportionality’;37 while there
are intuitively-known properties that an art work possesses if it is
beautiful—such as ‘integrity’, ‘proportion’ or ‘harmony’ and ‘clar-
ity’38 there are no fixed meanings of beauty with regard to artworks.
For both Aquinas and Maritain, ‘Each artwork is beautiful on its own
terms, subject to varying tastes, education and [ . . . ] aesthetic appre-
ciation of its audience. As an inexhaustible transcendental, beauty
can be expressed in an infinite number of ways by artists.’39
Now, Maritain makes the claim that whatever is beautiful is loved,
and if an artwork cannot be loved, it cannot be seen as beautiful.40
Maritain seems to be correct here. Art that is ugly or that is made to
morally insult, shock or disgust cannot be loved in the same way as
a traditional portrait, landscape, sculpture or even an abstract work
which aims at imitation, representation, conceptual clarification, and
34 Ibid., pp. 104–105.
35 Jean Cocteau, quoted in Noe¨l Simolo, Jean Cocteau: Lies and Truth, via: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIZRT4Eud4I.
36 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, p. 105.
37 Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 173.
38 Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism (trans. J. F. Scanlan), 4th impression
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1934), pp. 24–25.
39 Anthony Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, New Blackfriars, vol. 96,
no. 1065 (2015), pp. 535–536.
40 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 59–60.
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most importantly, enjoyment in and for itself, precisely because its
intention is to shock or humiliate or disgust. Such art is neither
created for the sake of the work itself nor enjoyed for its own sake
by its audience, but made and consumed for practical, sometimes
visceral purposes.41 Something is recognisable as an art work when it
is created such that it is intelligible as such, that is, when it possesses
aesthetic properties, recognisable emotional content—what Maritain
calls ‘intentional emotion’—made freely for its own enjoyment and
is thus ‘cleared of all adventitious elements’.42
The context or method of production also seems to bespeak the
truth of Maritain’s claim here: Joseph Beuy’s sculptures made out
of fat or Stelarc’s Ear on Arm are difficult to love or find beautiful.
Martin Creed’s conceptual work blu tack is hard to love because of
its apparent effortless production, even if we can interpret the work
and find it conceptually interesting. The clearest example concern-
ing context and method in support of Maritain’s view concerning
love and beauty (and supporting his overall theory concerning art
and morality), however, is the Tate Gallery’s withdrawal of Graham
Ovenden’s illustrations of unclothed young girls in 2013 when it was
discovered Ovenden had sexually molested some of them.43 With a
spokesperson saying the criminal charges ‘shone a new light’ on the
artworks, it was felt that the crimes undermined their aesthetic mer-
its. In 2015, a court in England ordered the destruction of much of
Ovenden’s work that featured young girls.44 Here we glimpse Mari-
tain’s sophisticated theory of both what art is and what it should or
should not be.
Pertinent to such considerations today, Maritain considers the pos-
sible regulation of art both by the Church and by the state. Maritain
asserts that state regulation and manipulation of art was the inevitable
result of the excesses of an artistic culture and practice ignoring moral
considerations and undermining cultural and political beliefs, liken-
ing the effect to a poison. Maritain takes the view that artworks that
require their maker to commit sin in their production or that are of a
libellous or obscene nature should at least be regulated intellectually
through art criticism and curators’ choices.45
At first, Maritain’s views here may strike one as absurd today,
but if we interpret the word ‘sin’ in an atheological fashion, there is
41 Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, pp. 536–538.
42 Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, p. 40.
43 Charlotte Higgins, ‘Tate removes Graham Ovenden prints after indecency convic-
tion’, The Guardian (3/4/13), available via: http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2013/
apr/03/tate-removes-graham-ovenden-prints.
44 Emine Saner, ‘From Caravaggio to Graham Ovenden: do artists’ crimes taint their
art?’, The Guardian (17/10/15), available via: http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/
2015/oct/17/from-caravaggio-to-graham-ovenden-do-artists-crimes-taint-their-art.
45 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 72–84.
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something to be said for them: is it not the case, to take Paul Virilio’s
general line of argument, that modern artistic practices, in breaking
down all methodological, cultural and moral barriers, risk the moral
and psychological integrity of society? With art’s search for the novel,
the lewd, the shocking and the disgusting, questions of the definition
of art and the possibility of regulation of the ‘art world’ internally
and are always being raised. Certainly art work such as Gunther
von Hagens’ exhibitions of preserved human corpses and Creed’s
Work No. 730, a close-up film of vaginal penetration, precisely at
a time when the questions of what the limits of art with respect to
the body in terms of transformation and mutilation are and whether
pornography is art are being asked makes us consider Maritain’s
words with a new appreciation. Maritain’s claim that artistic criticism
serves the double function of judgement of the aesthetic values and
the moral implications of an art work seems correct if we consider
again the Tate Gallery’s withdrawal or Ovenden’s drawings and also
the fact that some ‘work’ is indeed rejected as art, precisely because
of a lack of artistic intention and an offensive mode of production,
such as that of ‘Cynthia Plaster Caster’.
Perhaps Maritain also provides some balance in his discussion of
‘art for the community,’ which is the notion that the demands of
the community determine the rules and purposes of art, making so-
cial value the supreme aesthetic value, ignoring the autonomy of
art intellectually and creatively. Maritain reiterates that unless be-
liefs are internalized as subconscious sources of creative intuition,
they will determine the virtue of art against its nature as directed
solely toward the good of the work. Work created under such con-
ditions Maritain aptly calls ‘propaganda art’, and much Soviet ‘art’
is regarded as such.46 Given utilitarian reasons for creation, in this
manner we may indeed draw an analogy between particular political
purposes and payment for an artwork. That said, Maritain considers
existentialist art in the same way,47 and here his thoughts seem un-
charitable or at least lacking subtlety and development. Were not the
existentialist beliefs (in all their dimensions) internalised by Sartre,
de Beauvoir and Camus, as indicated by the range of their work
in its content and media? But even if we deny this, Sartre’s novel
Nausea, for example, a book which, as Murdoch remarks, ‘lives on
many levels’ and which serves as the ‘master-image of Sartre’s think-
ing’,48 seems to be as much a literary masterpiece as a philosophical
masterpiece.
46 Ibid., p. 73.
47 Ibid.
48 Murdoch, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, p. 4.
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II
Purifying the Source: Art, Politics and Religion
We may identify two central themes of Maritain’s ethics of art. The
first is the Christian theme of the dependence of art on the artist’s
moral character and the need to align oneself with God to overcome
what is otherwise an insoluble dilemma between the exigencies of
art and morality for artists who are concerned about such, and the
second theme is the interpersonal nature of art, with regard to the
artist and God, between artists themselves, and between the artist
and the community. I would like to bring out Maritain’s Thomistic
pre-occupations and bring the two themes together.
In Maritain’s thought, derived from that of Aquinas and replicated
more or less exactly in the modern Catholic Church’s papal encycli-
cals and teaching, a clear hierarchy of God as ‘ultimate absolute
end’ and the community’s ‘common good’ exists (where the former
stands higher than the latter). Figuratively speaking, the ‘horizontal’
line of societal progress must be informed by the ‘vertical’ line of
moral and spiritual progress in each person’s life with respect to his
or her transcendent relationship with God.49 Acknowledgement of
both axes and lines of human development Maritain elsewhere calls
‘integral humanism’.50 Human society has to not only accommo-
date spiritual values, but to be guided by them, and what we see in
Maritain’s ethics of art is a cumulative case being made by Maritain
that being an artist is a vocation, and that the thoughts expressed and
methods used by the artist must have recourse to Christian morality
for the moral and spiritual well-being of society. Thus both the artist
and the community must ‘purify the source’, the latter being fully
entitled to regulate art that opposes the ‘perfection of human life’,
given, as Aristotle and Aquinas say, the common good is superior to
the individual good and serves the individual good. I believe that in
Maritain’s thought it is evident that art is fundamentally political in
the sense that there is what we may call a ‘politics of ideas’ operative
in artistic creation and the presentation of artworks, and this brings
us to how Maritain’s views stand in relation to the ethical criticism
of art today.
With respect to the religious and political themes that we find
in Maritain’s ethics of art—in particular the ‘politics of ideas’
49 Jacques Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, trans. M. J. Adler (London: Geoffrey
Bles, 1940), p. 10; Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans. J. J.
Fitzgerald (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 16, 21, 80, 85.
50 Cf. Maritain’s famous book by the same name and the essays ‘Integral Humanism
and the Crisis of Modern Times’ and ’The Human Person and Society’ in his other work,
Scholasticism and Politics.
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posited—certain parallels to the contemporary philosopher Jacques
Rancie`re’s notion of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ can be made.
The distribution of the sensible refers to the systems of power which
determine what is sayable, audible, visible and therefore also which
artistic practices are permitted in a society.51 For Rancie`re, aesthet-
ics and politics are necessarily interlinked, and he gives a historical
analysis of this relationship, detailing the historical development of
modes of the distribution of the sensible by what he calls ‘artistic
(or aesthetic) regimes’—different forms of organisation encompass-
ing forms of visibility, ways of doing and making art, and ways
of conceptualising such in a democratising movement that aims at
freedom of thought and practice.
Rancie`re distinguishes three regimes. The ‘ethical regime’, exem-
plified by Plato, conceived art as merely mimetic, giving art and
the artist the same social status as common labour and labourer
and an ethical status of inferiority as compared to philosophy.52 The
‘representative regime’ conceived art as not merely as the activity
of making resemblances of reality, but also as poetically represent-
ing it by means of and through categories exclusively artistic, such
as genres, making art a ‘visible’ activity in society, and therefore
autonomous from other activities in the community.53 Finally, the
aesthetic regime, in which the term ‘aesthetic’ does not refer to a
theory of sensibility and taste, but rather refers to the mode of being
in which artistic phenomena are recognisable as such; that is, ‘the
regime that strictly identifies art in the singular and frees it from
any specific rule, from any hierarchy of the arts, subject matter, and
genres.’54 ‘The aesthetic regime asserts the absolute singularity of art
and, at the same time, destroys any pragmatic criterion for isolating
this singularity.’55 It is in the aesthetic regime that the revolutionary
changes in the conceptions, methods and presentations of art and the
relationship between art and morality occurred.56
Now, in my analysis, if we take the Christian view that Christ is
Lord of our mind as well as our hearts,57 there is indeed a ‘politics
of ideas’ that determines the conception of art, as well as its method
of production and presentation and dissemination in Maritain’s
thought, which I have dubbed ‘purifying the source’. With respect to
the quotes by O’Connor and Camus concerning art and truth given at
51 Jacques Rancie`re, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. G. Rockhill (2006 reprint)
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), pp. 7–8.
52 Ibid. p. 16.
53 Ibid. pp. 16–17.
54 Ibid. pp. 18–19.
55 Ibid., p. 19.
56 Ibid. pp. 19–24.
57 Cf. 2 Corinthians 10:5 and Matthew 5:27 in most translations of the New Testament.
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the start of this article, we may justifiably posit that Maritain would
be in full agreement with them, with the qualification that the truth
to be served in creating art is Christian ‘Truth’—truth being a tran-
scendental and thus ontologically synonymous with God. This would
mirror Maritain’s view that philosophy is negatively governed by right
Christian theology and that adherence to Christian Truth ought to be
the first and foremost concern of the Christian philosopher.58 ‘Puri-
fying the source’, then, applies particularly for the Christian artist,
and perhaps one could make use of Maritain’s thought to develop
Rancie`re’s historical analysis of the distribution of the sensible—
perhaps introducing another artistic regime that pertains to the Chris-
tian ethics of art, which unlike the others is ever-present for Christian
artists—even in our presently secularised society—involving the ex-
trinsic, negative regulation by morality on art and the positive notion
of freedom with which the Christian artist works, as the condition of
his or her faith.
The questions to be explored in conceiving such an artistic regime
would be how art is conceived with respect to the artist’s per-
sonal relationship to God, how the artist can or should represent the
divine, the responsibility the artist has in adhering to Christian Truth,
the function of art in relation to liturgy, prayer and worship, and how
art functions for or affects the general life of the community of the
Church. Such considerations are significant for every art form and
artefact that has relevance for the Christian artist and the Christian
community, including poetry, hymns, statues, stained glass art, the de-
sign of churches and clerical vestments and plays, commissions and
exhibitions sponsored by churches or church organisations.59 These
considerations also touch upon and perhaps challenge Maritain’s dis-
tinction of senses in the term ‘Christian art’, between ‘ecclesiastical
art’—created in accordance with specific religiously-sanctioned rules
as if Christian art was a genre—and Christian art as art produced
in accordance with the moral law and aiming at beauty as described
58 Jacques Maritain, The Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself
about the Present Time, trans, M. Cuddihy and E. Hughes (London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1968), pp. 87–94.
59 I have in mind, for example, such organisations as the Sheen Center for Thought
and Culture in New York. The Center, which opened in 2014 and is named in honour
of Catholic Archbishop Fulton Sheeen, is funded by the Archdiocese of New York, and
while it states that it aims ‘to proclaim that life is worth living, especially when we
seek to deepen, explore, challenge, and stimulate ourselves, Catholic and non-Catholic
alike’, the Center also states that it ‘is a forum to highlight the true, the good, and the
beautiful’ and that it is ‘Cognizant of our creation in the image and likeness of God’.
The Center offers commissions and artistic residencies to Catholic artists and has caused
controversy for disallowing the performance of Neil LaBute’s short play ‘Mohammad
Gets a Boner’, for reasons that are obvious. Cf. http://sheencenter.org/about/ and http://
www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/sheen-center-church-new-mission-bowery-article-
1.2357492.
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earlier, but not necessarily having religious purposes or objects.60
Maritain argues elsewhere that religion alone can rescue art and artists
from a crushing self-consciousness, false metaphysical assumptions
about the nature of the world and the human person and pseudo sys-
tems of ethics, as well as—and most importantly—direct the artist to
the spiritual, illuminating the direct relationship between poetry and
God.61
However, it seems that if one is a Christian artist, regardless of
the age in which one works, one will have religious beliefs which
define one’s existential state with respect to the worth and meaning
or purpose of one’s life, one’s relationship to God and other human
beings, and the rightness or wrongness of certain activities in virtue
of their means, content or consequences—that is, efficacious notions
of vice, virtue and sin. So if what art could or should be is determined
by whether it explicitly or implicitly (through observance of the moral
law and pursuit of the transcendentals) serves to worship or ‘glorify’
God as we have seen throughout our analysis of Maritain’s ethics of
art, then it seems that there is a Christian artistic regime. And this
amounts to far more than an intuitive or connatural pursuit of the
transcendentals in artistic creation or appreciation.
Maritain and the Ethical Criticism of Art Today
Maritain’s definition of (free) art rests on two pillars: first, art as
one manifestation of the practical virtue of art, which is the making
of objects, and second, a traditional theory of beauty derived from
Aristotle, Aquinas and Charles Batteaux. As argued elsewhere, ana-
lytical philosophers of art will welcome Maritain’s alternative theory
of art as a virtue of the creation of objects—despite the fact that he
does not once refer to utterly transforming artists such as Duchamp—
in that it goes beyond the debates between representative, expressive,
formative, institutional and historical-reflexive theories. That art could
be a practical virtue of making seems to account well for art’s univer-
sality in history and among cultures, and particularly well for trends
in modern art, such abstract or conceptual and formless (informe) or
technical art, the former of which rejects most defining categories of
art and the latter of which rejects the idea that an artwork has to be
‘for’ or ‘about’ anything, and asserts that an artwork can merely be
a technical exercise.62
Maritain’s aesthetics of love and beauty provides significant in-
sights into contemporary issues of art and ethics. From Maritain’s
60 Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, pp. 63–64; Cocteau and Maritain, Art and Faith,
pp. 106–108.
61 Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, pp. 96–104, 119.
62 Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, pp. 530–533.
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argument that elements of moral praiseworthiness of an artwork in
itself or the artist in his intention contribute to the aesthetic quality
of an artwork and his concession that moral flaws of an artwork or
the artist in his intentions or method of production may be aestheti-
cally necessary and even beneficial, one can identify in Maritain both
what is known in the ethical criticism of art as ‘moderate moralism’
and ‘ethicism’. Moderate moralism is the view that we can make
moral judgements about artworks and that the moral properties of an
artwork can also be aesthetic qualities, such that an artwork’s moral
defects can also serve as aesthetic defects, and the same goes for an
artwork’s moral merits.63 Ethicism is the view that:
. . . the ethical assessment of attitudes manifested by works of art is a
legitimate aspect of the aesthetic evaluation of those works, such that,
if a work manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes, it is to that extent
aesthetically defective, and if a work manifests ethically commendable
attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically meritorious.64
Moderate moralism and ethicism are not identical positions given
that ethicism, as defined by Gaut, does not feature the modal verb
‘can’, but rather features ‘is’, which as Gaut says, implies that ‘mani-
festing ethically admirable attitudes counts toward the aesthetic merit
of a work, and manifesting ethically reprehensible attitudes counts
against its aesthetic merit.’65 Ethicism is a stronger claim, operat-
ing at a deeper level of attitudes manifested in and engendered by
artworks.
These positions are to be contrasted with other positions in the
ethical criticism of art, such as ‘autonomism(s)’, which in general
hold that moral and aesthetic values and categories are of a com-
pletely different order and that the aesthetic values of an art work
can never be affected by its alleged moral properties or lack thereof.
While ‘moderate’ autonomism claims that it is sometimes acceptable
to make moral judgements about artworks without those judgements
also being aesthetic judgements, ‘radical’ autonomism claims that
it is always inappropriate to subject artworks to moral evaluation.66
Maritain’s moderate moralism and ethicism are also to be contrasted
with ‘radical moralism’, the view that aesthetic values are reducible to
moral values, including those relevant to moral education and social
63 Noe¨l Carroll, Noe¨l Carroll, ‘Art and Ethical Criticism: An Overview of Recent
Directions of Research’, Ethics, vol. 110, no. 2 (2000), pp. 374–375, 377–378.
64 Berys Gaut, ‘The Ethical Criticism of Art,’ in J. Levinson (ed.), Aesthetics and
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 182.
65 Ibid.
66 Noe¨l Carroll, ‘Moderate Moralism’, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 36, no. 3
(1996), pp. 231–232.
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utility.67 Maritain holds neither autonomism(s) nor radical moralism
for the following reasons.
In the second chapter in The Responsibility of the Artist, he claims
that the 19th century notion of l’art pour l’art (art for art’s sake)—
which may be taken as the motto for the radical autonomist view—is
logically incoherent,68 arguing, as we have seen, that the aesthetic
content of art works is necessarily bound up with moral content in
virtue of the artist’s own personality, interests, life experiences, and
the context of interpersonal relations in which he works—that is,
material causality.69 We have also seen that Maritain makes a strong
case that art works, in their form, material, content and method of
production, can have both positive and negative moral effects upon
individuals and the community, but also a normative defining prin-
ciple of art that amounts to the claim that disturbing, disgusting or
offensive ‘art’ is not strictly speaking genuine art, or free art which
is created for beauty’s sake and is thereby borne of positive attitudes.
This exhibits an ethicist line of argument concerning psychological
attitudes, which is somewhat deeper than the moderate moralist posi-
tion that is concerned with surface features, and which seems to me
very closely linked with Maritain’s notions of ‘poetry’ and ‘creative
intuition’.70 Clearly, Maritain also does not hold a radical moralist
position, because for him, art is extrinsically and indirectly subor-
dinated to morality; there are no ethico-theological rules for what
constitutes a beautiful art work and the rules or methods of art there-
fore can and do change.71 Again, art, for Maritain, is the creation of
beautiful works valuable in and for themselves, which can by defini-
tion, serve neither utilitarian or political purposes. It is also of both
biographical and philosophical significance that Maritain was friends
with many modernist visual artists, including Cocteau, Picasso, and
Rouault, and was considered as something of an artistic liberal in
Catholic circles.
The combination in Maritain’s thought of moralism and ethicism
provides for flexibility in attributing moral properties to art works
and examining the relationship between art and morality both gen-
erally and specifically as it pertains to particular artworks and to
forms and problems that are intrinsic to them, such as the formal and
stylistic problem of moral didacticism in writing fiction. Maritain’s
alternative and composite theories of the relationship between art
and ethics parallels his composite definition of art as a virtue of the
practical intellect consisting of making beautiful physical artefacts or
67 Ibid., p. 236.
68 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, p. 48, 65.
69 Ibid., pp. 47–65.
70 Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, pp. 536–538.
71 Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, pp. 45–50.
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performances, and such a view has considerable explanatory power
and scope, as well as clarity as a set of normative principles ascer-
taining what can or should or should not be art, and moral properties
artworks possess.72
This area of contact with apparently differing views in the ethical
criticism of art is certainly one that invites further investigation. Of
particular interest here, and one which might challenge my interpreta-
tion of Maritain’s views is Maritain’s concession, related earlier, that
it is impossible to know whether artworks would be artistically bet-
ter if their creator had followed the ‘moral law’ rather than ‘merely
artistic morality’ and the objection to moderate moralism that moral
defects of an artwork can have aesthetic merit, or even make con-
ceiving some artworks possible.73
Conclusions
Where the remarks of poets such as Rilke on art, morality and re-
ligion have been of a necessarily obscure manner, and those of or-
thodox Christian writers such as C. S. Lewis, Tolkien and O’Connor
have been of a popular manner, Maritain makes a systematic and
philosophically-informed case that art is a vocation, necessarily bound
up with the life of the spirit and with (Christian) morality. Maritain
attempts a philosophical and theological solution of the apparent con-
flict between art and morality by a distinction between making and
doing, such that, taking the human being as a whole, art is extrinsi-
cally and indirectly subordinated to morality—and through the pursuit
of beauty, goodness and truth, intuitively and freely so. The extent
to which this view is internally consistent regarding the distinction
between ‘Christian art’ as Maritain conceives such (the pursuit of
the transcendentals) and ‘Christian art’, as a rigidly defined artistic
regime is debatable; however, as I have tried to indicate, Maritain’s
ethics of art offers important contributions to contemporary debates
in the alternative and composite theories of moralism and ethicism
in the ethical criticism of art, paralleling his composite definition of
art as a virtue of the practical intellect consisting of making beauti-
ful physical artefacts or performances. For these reasons, Maritain’s
ethics of art, like his philosophy or definition of art, is an area of
study which most definitely invites further analysis and calls for a
revitalisation of scholarship in Maritain’s aesthetics generally.
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